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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1938, the federal government has regulated the natural gas
industry. Today, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), the successor to the Federal Power Commission ("FPC" or
"Commission"), while ostensibly still required by Congressional man-
date to regulate the natural gas industry, has charted a precise course
* Winning essay of the Seventeenth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute
Energy Law Essay Competition.
t B.A., Wesleyan University, 1988; J.D., George Washington University National Law
Center, 1993. Mr. Fagan currently specializes in energy and public utility law.
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toward deregulation. Its newly issued Order No. 636,1 and on rehear-
ing Orders No. 636-A and 636-B, maps out the future of the natural
gas industry. Through this Order, the FERC intends to abandon the
old regulatory system in favor of the brave new world of deregulation
and free competition. To reach this objective, Order No. 636 proposes
a complete overhaul of the industry through the individual restructur-
ing of interstate pipeline services. The central feature of these new
arrangements will be the unbundling of sales and transportation serv-
ices, thereby giving all participants in the gas industry equal access to
quality service.
The decision to deregulate the natural gas industry was not made
overnight. Since 1978, when Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy
Act, the federal government has increasingly sought to enhance the
influence of market forces, and conversely, to minimize the influence
of regulatory forces. A product of political choice and economic real-
ity, the decade-and-a-half-old experiment is now a permanent fixture
of United States energy policy. The complete deregulation of the nat-
ural gas industry, however, has not come cheap. With billions of dol-
lars potentially at stake, parties which rely upon and are dependent
upon the old regulatory apparatus do so at their own peril. Nowhere
is this assertion better demonstrated than in regard to small customers
and their place in the post-636 natural gas market.
Natural gas regulation emerged over a half century ago primarily
to protect the individual customer from the predatory practices of mo-
nopolistic pipelines. Today, although the potential for monopolistic
exploitation has largely dissipated, the precarious position of residen-
tial consumers has not. Although the current watchwords of open ac-
cess and unbundling may have considerable appeal, it remains to be
seen whether the small players in the industry will be able to share in
its anticipated rewards. Despite FERC assertions to the contrary, the
substantive provisions of the restructuring rules do not appear to con-
tain sufficient protections for the small consumer. This development
signals a disturbing trend in an industry which, while still paying lip
service to the groups it was originally charged to protect, has drifted
1. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing
Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Well-
head Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992), m F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs, 1 30,939 (1992), order on
reh'g, Order No. 636-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992), I1 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,950 (1992),
reh'g denied, Order No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (1992), 61 F.E.R.C. 1 61,272 (1992), appeal
pending, Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC (D.C. Cir.).
[Vol. 29:707
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further and further away from its historic mandate. Pipelines now op-
erate under fewer consumer-oriented regulatory constraints than ever
before and, hence, do not currently have any incentives to contain
costs. As the "636" series of rules are inevitably challenged, both at
the administrative level and at the federal court level, the effects of
unbundled service on captive customers will undoubtedly be one of
the most hotly contested issues.2
II. THE STRucruRE OF THE NATuRAL GAS INDusTRY
The historic and current role of the individual consumer cannot
be evaluated without an examination of the natural gas industry's or-
ganizational scheme. The industry is composed of the producers of
the commodity, the pipeline companies who transport it, the local dis-
tribution companies who make it available to the public, and of
course, the consumer who uses the service at the end-link in the indus-
try chain. For over fifty years, these entities have produced, trans-
ported, sold, distributed, and consumed the nation's gas supplies
under a comprehensive regulatory umbrella. Because these segments
are all bound together, historically as well as economically, by the ma-
trix of both federal and state regulation, any policy decision affecting
one necessarily affects the others.
The initial players in the natural gas market, the producers, or the
"wellhead" as they are collectively termed, have traditionally explored
and drilled for the resource, and have subsequently sold it to the pipe-
line companies.3 Although they were not originally subject to regula-
tion, the Supreme Court ruled in 1954, that wellhead prices fell within
2. At press time, the Commission's pipeline restructuring rule is currently awaiting review
in the D.C. Circuit which is now in the process of consolidating the voluminous number of ap-
peals into one hearing. The first of the more than 200 petitions for review was filed on August
13, 1992. After the Eleventh Circuit was chosen as the circuit court in which to consolidate all of
the petitions, the Exxon corporation moved on October 2, 1992 for a change of venue to the
D.C. Circuit. After sixteen months elapsed, the Eleventh Circuit finally granted Exxon's motion
(and that of the Process Gas Consumer Group) on February 15, 1994, for a change in venue to
the D.C. Circuit. The appeal of Order No. 636 is now subsumed under Atlanta Gas Light Co. v.
FERC. As yet, no docket number has been assigned as the D.C. Circuit is still sifting through
the appeals. See Eleventh Circuit Grants Motions For Change of Venue and Transfers Over 100
Petitions to Review Order No. 636 to D.C. Circuit, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., No. 1967, (1994), at
12-13; Daniel Drosdoff, Court Delays, Passage of 7ime Hurt Challenges to Order 636, 10 NAT.
GAS WEEK, Mar. 7, 1994, at 5-6.
3. See Tenneco Gas v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1187, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1992); CHARLES F. PHILLIPs,
JR., THE REGULATION OF PuBLic UTILITIES 696 (1993).
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the statutory jurisdiction of the FPC, rejecting the argument that well-
head pricing was exclusively a state concern.4 Today, the producers'
industry operate under a minimal degree of command and control.
Just over four years ago, Congress effectively reversed the Supreme
Court's holding with the passage of the Natural Gas Wellhead Decon-
trol Act of 1989.1
Once the gas leaves the wellhead, the pipelines intercept it and
transport it from those geographic areas rich in the natural resource to
those areas without it. The pipelines purchase gas either from the
producers themselves or from other pipelines. The classic "middle-
man" within the industry as well as the segment subject to the most
regulation, the pipelines have historically acted as merchants.6 They
buy the gas with the intention of reselling it, and transport it over
large areas to customers at the other end of the pipeline. Yet, with
deregulatory impulses sweeping through the industry and culminating
in Order No. 636, the pipeline owners have increasingly been forced
to forsake their traditional merchant role, and to operate almost ex-
clusively as common carrier transporters.
The third component within the natural gas mix are the local dis-
tribution companies ("LDCs"). The LDCs purchase gas from the
pipelines and resell it to customers within their given geographic area,
primarily large industrial users or residential consumers. Operating
primarily within state boundaries, and thus exempt from most federal
regulation, LDCs have answered to state utility commissions. Histori-
cally, state jurisdiction attaches at the point where the gas leaves the
interstate pipeline facilities and enters the smaller LDC pipelines.7
Traditional natural gas regulation sought to strike a balance be-
tween all of the various segments of the industry, with the end-user,
the consumers, constituting the favored interest. Over time, competi-
tion has replaced the consumer as the preference underlying the fed-
eral government's approach toward managing the natural gas
4. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672,677 (1954), reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 851
(1954).
5. Pub. L. No. 101-60,103 Stat. 157 (1989) (repealing Title I of the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-33 (1988)).
6. Although interstate pipelines have traditionally been federally regulated, intrastate
pipelines have predominantly been subject to state and local regulations. See Oklahoma v.
FERC, 661 F.2d 832,834 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982). Although the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged the federal-state jurisdictional boundaries over natural gas, it affirmed the
district court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the Natural Gas Policy Act imposing
price controls on wholly intrastate gas. Id.
7. Frank R. Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity and
Natural Gas: A Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY L.J. 277, 306-09 (1989).
[Vol. 29:707
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industry. Competitive developments, while they may produce an opti-
mal result in time, have thus far been problematic. Having patterned
their economic behavior and expectations around decades of regula-
tion and protection, residential consumers have now had to readjust
under deregulation. They are arguably far more constrained in their
economic behavior and more limited in resources than are producers,
pipelines, or LDCs. This argument is not to suggest that a fully com-
petitive natural gas industry is not a desirable outcome. If someday
the free market for natural gas can provide ready supply at low prices,
then all will benefit. Before that point can be reached, however, the
problems facing small customers in the wake of post-636 transition
must be resolved.
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE NATURAL GAS Acr OF 1938
The natural gas industry entered the world of regulation with the
Natural Gas Act ("NGA") in 1938.8 Its passage transformed the in-
dustry from an object of largely provincial concern to one of great
national import. The Act transferred the authority to make major de-
cisions regarding the transportation and sale of the commodity from
state and local governments to federal regulators. Purely intrastate
transactions were not to be affected by the Act while interstate trans-
actions were. 9
Congress empowered the Federal Power Commission to assert ju-
risdiction over three major activities of the natural gas industry. The
primary category of regulation was the sale of gas. All interstate sales
of gas for resale had to be "just and reasonable."'" Moreover, the
FPC had to authorize every sale by granting a certificate of public
convenience and necessity." The second area of regulation was the
8. Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556,52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w
(1988)).
9. The NGA provided:
The provisions of this [Act] shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natu-
ral-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or
to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural
gas.
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
10. "Just and Reasonable" is the current standard of review for the sale of natural gas under
the NGA. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1988).
11. This provision is still in force today. A certificate will be granted only after an applica-
tion is filed with the FERC which is then open for review and a hearing. 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
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transportation of such gas. Prior to any interstate transportation, a
pipeline also had to obtain a public convenience and necessity certifi-
cate."2 Finally, the FPC regulated abandonment. Once a facility or
pipeline service became subject to its jurisdiction, it could not be dis-
continued without FPC approval.' 3
Preserving the interests of small residential users was the impetus
behind the passage of the NGA. Congress was concerned that the
monopolistic characteristics of the natural gas industry would harm
the small residential users. In 1935, three years before the NGA's
passage, the Federal Trade Commission compiled a study concluding
that the natural gas pipeline industry was indeed a natural monop-
oly.' 4 Wishing to minimize any adverse effects from potentially an-
ticompetitive practices, Congress drafted the NGA with the clear
intention of protecting the individual consumer. Its main focus was to
guarantee the consumer a reliable source of natural gas at a price de-
termined to be reasonable. 5
To accomplish this objective, Congress had to assure interstate
pipeline companies that any investment in transportation and sales
could be recovered. This assurance raised two concerns. First, the
pipelines would have to have enough gas to meet consumer demand in
order to cover their construction costs. Second, they had to have a
predetermined market for their gas sales.'6
The FPC developed a three part strategy to balance the pipelines'
interest in sharing the risk involved in transporting and selling natural
gas, against the consumers' concerns of not having to pay excessive
prices for reliable service. 7 The first part of this strategy permitted
12. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(a) (1988).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
14. At the time, only four large interstate pipeline companies were responsible for the sale
and transportation to the LDCs within their given geographic area. In addition, they resembled
natural monopsonies because they were also the exclusive purchasers of gas from the production
wellheads in their area. Noting that the industry contained some of the textbook features of a
monopoly/monopsony (for instance, abnormally high prices, considerable accumulation of
wealth at the expense of producers and consumers, and insufficient availability of the pipeline
service), the FTC recommended that the industry be regulated. Report of the FTC to the U.S.
Senate, S. Doc. No. 92,70th Cong., 1st Sess. 588-91 (1928); Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the
Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. Rv. 345, 348
(1983).
15. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944) ("The primary aim of [the
Natural Gas Act] was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas
companies.").
16. Charles Stalon & Reinier Lock, State-Federal Relation in the Economic Regulation of
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pipelines to achieve a monopoly over the sale of gas through the pro-
vision of a "bundled" service. A bundled service allowed a pipeline to
provide transportation of gas only to parties who purchased from it.
LDCs and large end-users who wished to buy directly from the well-
head could not force the pipeline to transport their gas. Because the
cost of building their own pipeline link to the wellhead was prohibitive
for such parties, LDCs and large end-users generally resigned them-
selves to accepting its bundled form.' 8
The second part of the strategy required each pipeline to contract
with producers for a ready supply of gas before they would be able to
either sell to a given market, or build a line to a new one. As the
typical duration of such producer-pipeline supply contracts was
twenty years, this requirement guaranteed LDCs and end-user cus-
tomers an adequate and reliable gas supply.' 9
The third prong of the natural gas regulation strategy provided
pipelines with a constant and stable level of demand for their services.
The effects of public convenience and necessity certificates not only
bound pipelines to a given market, they also bound the markets to a
given pipeline.20 Consequently, LDCs were obligated to enter into
twenty year contracts with the pipelines. In other words, because
LDCs were usually required by local and state regulations to sell gas
to specific communities and end-users, pipeline supply was marketed
for a captive demand 21
During the initial decades of this regulatory strategy, three dis-
tinct characteristics emerged within the natural gas industry.
Predominantly, the transportation monopoly which pipelines enjoyed
became a permanent feature of the industry and was increasingly ex-
tended to sales of gas in interstate markets. 2 Second, within the well-
head-pipeline-LDC-burner-tip framework, the interstate pipeline
acted as a middleman for the rest of the industry segments and thus,
increasingly occupied a role of central importance within the entire
industry2 3 Under this arrangement, producers, LDCs, and end-users
did not have contact with one another. Any economic relationship
which existed between them operated through the pipelines. Finally,
18. Id.
19. Id. at 479-80.
20. Id. at 480.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 480.
23. Id. at 481.
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the risks of the industry were largely allocated to the end-user custom-
ers. Insulated from competitive pressures through devices such as cer-
tification requirements, bundled service monopolies, and virtual sole
supplier control over their markets, pipelines earned a sizeable rate of
return on their investments.24 Because the downstream end-users
were dependent upon the monopolistic pipelines for supply and pric-
ing, they were unable to respond to fluctuations in sales or service.
In spite of its shortcomings, the NGA-created system seemed sat-
isfactory for all concerned. Producers did not have to worry about
pipeline buyers to whom they could unload their gas. Pipelines did
not fear any attempts at "cream-skimming" their monopoly service by
potential competitors, and LDCs and end-users were confident that
they would not suffer any lags in their supply requirements, or disrup-
tions in their service, respectively.
IV. PRODUCER PRICE REGULATION: THE PHLLIPS DECISION
The Supreme Court extended FPC jurisdiction to producers at
the wellhead in Phillips Petroleum v. Wisconsin.'5 A producer who
sold gas for resale in interstate commerce was held to fall within the
regulatory ambit of the NGA.26 For the first time, producers became
subject to FPC regulation. The result in Phillips was not received fa-
vorably. The widespread political consensus which had initially sup-
ported regulatory control of the natural gas industry began to
dissipate once the FPC tried to regulate producer prices.27 Resentful
of what they perceived as arbitrary encroachments upon their profit
margins, producers began closing ranks against both the regulators
and the consumer interests which government intervention was sworn
to protect.
A second and more serious consequence of the Phillips mandate
24. Martin Kirkwood, Comment, Distributor Bypass in the Deregulated Natural Gas Indus.
try - Are Consumers Being Left in the Cold?, 39 CATH. U.L. REv. 1157, 1173 n.111 (1990).
25. 347 U.S. 672 (1954), reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
26. Once again, the Court noted that consumer protection was the primary motivation be-
hind the Natural Gas Act. Accordingly, the Court held, "[R]egulation of the sales in interstate
commerce for resale made by a so-called independent natural gas producer is not essentially
different from regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate of an interstate pipeline com-
pany. In both cases, the rates charged may have a direct and substantial effect on the price paid
by the ultimate consumers. Protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural-
gas companies was the primary aim of the Natural-Gas Act." Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
27. Stalon and Lock, supra note 16, at 483.
[Vol. 29:707
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/6
1994] NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY SMALL CONSUMER 715
was the increasing division of the industry into interstate and intra-
state markets- 8 In an effort to set the individual rates of every in-
dependent producer, the FPC created an impossible caseload for itself
as each proceeding was excruciatingly long and difficult to resolve. To
better perform its task of wellhead price regulation, in 1960 the FPC
developed the system of "vintaging." 9 Vintaging allowed the Com-
mission to regulate producer rates by geographic area, thereby obviat-
ing the need to hold case-by-case rate proceedings.3
One factor affecting rates under the vintaging system was
whether the gas was "old" or "new." "Old" gas, or gas that was al-
ready discovered and flowing, was subject to artificially low price ceil-
ings. "New" gas, gas which had not yet been discovered and thus was
not available for production, was allowed a higher price limit to en-
courage the exploration of untapped reserves.31 Therefore, vintaging
induced the established producers (who had mostly "old" gas to sell)
to confine their gas to the intrastate market which was not subject to
FPC authority so they could charge a higher rate for "old" gas.3"
Pipeline customers also encouraged producers to focus their attention
intrastate by refusing to pay for anything other than the cheaper old
gas.33
Certification of pipeline construction and services also became
more complex after wellhead controls were adopted. The additional
responsibility of regulating wellhead prices as well as that of "old" gas
forced the Commission to spend more time scrutinizing pipeline cer-
tificates. The FPC was especially concerned that low-price old gas
would not be made available on the interstate market and would
therefore jeopardize the overall interstate gas supply. Forced to pri-
oritize end-users in time of shortage, the FPC had to juggle all of the
purchasing segments of the industry, the pipelines, the LDCs, the end-
user customers, in a plan which contributed to the growing complexity
28. Id. at 483-84.
29. Statement of General Policy, No. 81-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
30. Area Rate Proceeding No. AR 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 1121, 1124 (1960).
31. Statement of General Policy, supra note 29; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747, 759-60 (1968) (affirming the geographic method of regulating wellhead rates).
32. Stalon and Lock, supra note 16, at 483-84.
33. This practice reached a critical point during the 1970's when the OPEC oil shocks
caused a corresponding rise in unregulated intrastate gas prices. At the same time, the price of
regulated interstate gas stayed at regulated levels. Inevitably, a surplus developed on the intra-
state market because buyers were unwilling to pay market-determined prices, and a shortage
developed on the interstate market because of the artificially low prices. Stalon & Lock, supra
note 16, at 483-84.
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of the industry.34
Critics noticed the increasingly balkanized nature of the industry.
The main culprit was the FPC's attempts at regulating wellhead prices
through vintaging, or "area rate" regulation. Only two years after the
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, the Fifth Circuit approved an area
rate proceeding with explicit reservation. The Court expressed its
concerns as to whether such regulations could help produce an ade-
quate gas supply.35 Despite abandoning this form of regulation in
favor of other forms of producer regulation, the Commission was
largely unsuccessful in maintaining a reliable interstate natural gas
supply.36
The possibility of shortage in the interstate natural gas market,
while always threatening, became a harsh reality during the mid-
1970's as division between the interstate market and the intrastate
market grew. The OPEC oil embargo of 1972-73 and record-cold win-
ters during the latter half of the decade produced a sharp rise in the
price for unregulated natural gas. These events combined with the
producers' disincentive to dedicate gas to the interstate regulated mar-
ket created problems on all fronts. As feared, the intrastate market
had a surplus of high priced natural gas, and the interstate market had
a shortage of the artificially low-priced gas. As the discrepancy in cost
widened between the "old" gas and "new" gas, the interstate market
increasingly encouraged consumption and discouraged conservation
at a time when macroeconomic conditions advised against it. Conse-
quently, the national interstate supply of natural gas decreased,
thereby jeopardizing the central caveat of the Natural Gas Act: con-
sumer access to cheap gas.37
V. TH BEGINNING OF DEREGULATION: THE NATURAL GAS
POLICY Acr OF 1978
Congress sought to address these problems with the passage of
34. David Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
70 Mmi. L. REv. 61, 72 (1985).
35. The Fifth Circuit termed the Commission's attempt at ensuring an adequate natural gas
supply as merely "whistling in the dark." Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407,
444 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
36. In 1974, the Commission eschewed area rate regulation altogether and implemented
national price ceilings for different types of gas. See Just and Reasonable National Rates for
Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 2215 (1974).
37. Section 1(a) of the Natural Gas Act expressly provides "that the business of transport-
ing and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public inter-
est .... 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1988). A nationwide shortage of natural gas would certainly be
considered counter to the public interest.
[Vol. 29:707
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the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ("NPGA")3 s The most significant
aspect of the NGPA was that it substantially loosened regulation of
wellhead prices in order to neutralize the debilitating effects of the
dual interstate/intrastate system.3 9 Dividing gas supplies into three
major categories, each with its own pricing formula, the Act sought to
implement a policy of phased deregulation. "High-cost" gas, which
was most expensive to explore and drill for, was deregulated immedi-
ately. "New" gas was subject to a ceiling which was to be increased
higher than the rate of inflation until complete deregulation on Janu-
ary 1, 1985. "Old" gas, the cheapest variety, had no set date for dereg-
ulation and was tied to a price ceiling equivalent to the rate of
inflation.40
The NPGA represented a major policy shift by Washington re-
garding the regulation of natural gas. By lifting the price ceilings and
other restrictions which tended to discourage production and balkan-
ize the gas markets, Congress hoped to achieve through deregulation
what had previously failed through regulation: ensuring the American
consumer a ready supply of natural gas. In enacting multiple price
categories for different types of gas, the NGPA encouraged producers
to supply more gas. At the same time, residential consumers were
protected because the more plentiful "old" gas was still subject to
strong regulatory controls.41 Yet, the multiple price categories also
had the effect of signaling to the industry that natural gas regulation
would not last forever. Indeed, by permitting some types of gas to be
deregulated, whether immediately, or by the end of 1984, the NGPA
conceded that consumers would eventually have to depend upon the
market, rather than the federal government, for protection against
high rates.
In addition to deregulating wellhead prices, the NGPA also
ended the historic pipeline monopoly as well. Under section 311 of
the NGPA, Congress encouraged the separation of the dual merchant/
transporter roles of the pipelines to better effectuate the integration
38. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988)).
39. The FERC lifted price controls on producers in order "to give market forces a more
significant role in determining the supply, the demand, and the price of natural gas.. ." Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409, 422 (1986).
40. Congress further implemented this policy through the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3301
(1988)) (eliminating all wellhead price controls by January 1, 1993).
41. JOSEPH P. TomArn ET AL, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 302 (1989).
1994]
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of the intrastate and interstate markets.42 The FERC could authorize
any pipeline to transport gas which was not its own to sell. As a result,
some interstate pipeline customers began purchasing gas directly from
producers or other sellers and then using the pipelines solely to pro-
vide transportation, or "unbundled" service. Thus, pipelines would
experience a loss of market power as their monopoly over transporta-
tion no longer meant a monopoly over sales. From the consumer
standpoint, section 311 indicated that unbundling would be path that
the industry would eventually follow. Subsequent Commission efforts
to promote the unbundling process served to erase any doubts regard-
ing this trend.
VI. THE TAKE-OR-PAY DmEMMA
Pipelines were the first to bear the brunt of deregulation. The
deregulation of prices at the wellhead and the unbundling of the
merchant and transportation functions of the interstate pipelines was
not the panacea which Congress envisioned. To be sure, such compet-
itive incentives boosted the supply and production of natural gas, and
therefore, reduced the inherent friction between the interstate and in-
trastate markets. As supplies grew and the price of gas fell,43 pipe-
lines were forced to bear a disproportionate share of the volume and
price risks of the deregulated commodity.
The problems the interstate pipelines faced after the promulga-
tion of the NGPA were largely from the long-term contracts they had
with producers. During the 1960's and 70's when a reliable supply of
natural gas at a reasonable price was an uncertainty, the pipelines
sought to safeguard their ability to meet their minimum public service
obligations as well as their projected future sales. Consequently, they
entered into contracts which permitted large-volume purchases of gas
42. 15 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988). The relevant provisions of §§ 311(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), and
(b)(1) of the NGPA which address the unbundling of interstate pipeline service read
respectively:
The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any interstate pipeline to transport
natural gas on behalf of (i) any intrastate pipeline; and (ii) any local distribution com-
pany. The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any intrastate pipeline to trans-
port natural gas on behalf of (i) any intrastate pipeline; and (ii) any local distribution
company served by any interstate pipeline. The Commission may, by rule or order,
authorize any intrastate pipeline to sell natural gas to (i) any interstate pipeline; and (ii)
any local distribution company served by any interstate pipeline.
Id.
43. Traditionally, producers bore such risks. The "volume risk" was "the risk that a pipeline
will in the future choose not to purchase any of the gas the producer has dedicated exclusively to
the pipeline." The "price risk" denoted "the risk that the future market price of gas will substan-
tially exceed the price stated in the contract." Pierce, supra note 14, at 355.
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in exchange for being subject to take-or-pay" and escalation clause4,
liability. Under the old regulatory system, such contractual terms did
not appear onerous because the price of gas was set at relatively low
levels. Pipelines could rely on the fact that any rise in natural gas
prices would be predictably small, and any lost sales to LDCs could be
absorbed rather easily. If prices were allowed to fluctuate with mar-
ket conditions, however, such losses could potentially be substantial.
The pipelines' contractual liability first became a critical problem
during the 1981-82 recession. Instead of the shortages which charac-
terized the industry during the previous decade, NGPA deregulation
created a surplus bubble as producers and pipelines encountered
fewer constraints in dedicating gas to the interstate markets.46 In
1982, this bubble grew larger. The economic downturn caused a drop
in the demand for natural gas as larger numbers of end-users stepped
up conservation efforts. The price of natural gas fell accordingly, but
the reduction was almost solely limited to the intrastate market and
the emerging spot market.47 The interstate pipelines were unable to
respond to these market conditions by lowering prices because they
were still contractually bound to pay higher prices to producers.
Purchasing gas at the wellhead at the contractual price, and trying to
resell the same to LDC and end-user customers who were only willing
to pay the lower market price for the gas, "squeezed" the pipelines.48
Prior to the NGPA, the interstate pipelines could have dictated
their customers' purchasing decisions by refusing to transport their gas
unless the pipelines were the ones who sold it. Under the new system
of "unbundled" service however, pipelines were no longer able to ex-
ert such control. Pursuant to the NGPA, large industrial end-users
who had "switchable" capacity could change to an alternative fuel if
they were dissatisfied with pipeline prices.49 Similarly, intrastate
44. A take-or-pay clause obligates a pipeline to purchase a certain amount of gas at a speci-
fied price and pay for the gas even if it is not taken. See Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v.
State Oil and Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409, 412 (1986).
45. An escalation clause requires a pipeline to pay an increasing amount for gas as its con-
tract price is tied to changes in both the nominal and real market values of the gas. See Pierce,
supra note 14, at 355.
46. Stalon & Lock, supra note 16, at 487.
47. The "spot market" refers to purchases and sales of natural gas on a short-term basis.
These contracts have traditionally been for lower prices than long-term arrangements because
the producer concedes to the pipeline the right to discontinue its spot sales when the long-term
contract is completed. HOWARD R. WILLrAMs & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS
TERSis, 1180 (8th ed. 1991).
48. See Crump, supra note 34, at 62.
49. See TOMAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 310. In order to try to prevent these customers
from switching fuels, the FERC instituted special marketing programs (SMPs) which allowed
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pipelines, who were now permitted to sell gas on the interstate mar-
ket, could require their interstate counterparts to transport their gas
pursuant to section 311. Whether bound by a take-or-pay contract or
an escalation contract, an interstate pipeline faced financial disaster
unless it could renegotiate the terms to which it agreed under regu-
lated conditions.5 0
Efforts by interstate pipelines to acquire relief for their poten-
tially huge liability were not received favorably by the producers at
the wellhead.5 1 For one thing, the producers believed that they were
performing a service for the pipelines by agreeing to dedicate large
volumes of gas to the interstate market at a time of comprehensive
regulation and price controls. Presumably, they could have sold their
gas for higher prices on the intrastate market just as easily.52 Sec-
ondly, and perhaps most importantly, producers maintained that the
long-term contracts were risks because they were based upon both
parties' good-faith expectations of future events. Merely because the
industry had been deregulated in the interim and the risks which the
pipelines bore were aggravated accordingly, was not a sufficient rea-
son for their abrogation. 3 Many producers thought it ironic that the
pipelines, who were insistent on observing contractual commitments
when the producers were selling gas at artificially low prices, were
now trying to avoid them. 4
VII. ORDER No. 436: THE OPEN ACCESS REGIME
The FERC responded to the charge of the NGPA by adopting a
formal policy to promote competition. The goal of this policy was to
alleviate the conditions which were strangling the pipelines.55 As a
pipelines to sell them cheaper gas. This provision, however, did not help the pipelines in covering
their fixed, operating, or take-or-pay costs. Thus, small customers who were unable to switch
fuels bore a disproportionate share of the pipelines' cost burden. These SMPs were struck down
as unduly discriminatory. Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
50. See Trunkline Gas Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,240 (1992) (stating that the interstate pipeline
faced more than $370 million in take-or-pay liability); see also United's Plan to Wipe Out its
Take-or-Pay Liability was Accepted, INSiDE FERC, Aug. 26,1991, at 10 (finding that United Gas
had accrued more than $857.8 million in take-or-pay liability).
51. Stuart Magowan, Nobody Likes the U.S. "Free" Market in Natural Gas, ENERGY ECON.,
Dec. 1988, at 9.
52. Pierce, supra note 14, at 355.
53. Magowan, supra note 51, at 9.
54. Id.
55. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,232, at 61,828 (1989). The Commission
noted:
Circumstances in the industry have changed by reasons including its own maturation,
[Vol. 29:707
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result, Order No. 436,16 which spells out this policy, made deregula-
tion a permanent fixture of the natural gas industry. While ostensibly
seeking to protect the interests of all concerned, the consumers' inter-
ests began to become less important within the natural gas regulatory
scheme under the FERC's new policy. In short, as the FERC nudged
the industry away from NGA-era regulations, it slowly shifted its fo-
cus away from the initial beneficiaries of these controls as well.
The hallmark of Order No. 436 was "open access" to interstate
pipeline systems on a nondiscriminatory basis.57 By permitting all
users of gas; whether an intrastate pipeline, an LDC, or a large end-
user; to employ interstate pipelines for transportation from any sup-
plier, the Order redefined the future of the industry, as well as the
place of residential consumers within it. The Commission sought to
provide "open access" by explicitly targeting transportation, certifica-
tion procedures, and billing mechanisms. In addressing transporta-
tion, the FERC took a further step toward the "unbundling" of the
interstate pipeline monopoly by encouraging pipelines to act as com-
mon carriers of natural gas. Instead of only transporting gas which
they themselves were reselling, pipelines could also transport on a
non-discriminatory basis gas which was not theirs to sell.58
Although the pipelines were not subject to Order No. 436, it pro-
vided a host of incentives for those pipelines which chose to comply.
First, pipelines which agreed to act as common carriers were better
the Congressional decision to deregulate the pricing operations of the competitive well-
head markets, the Commission's encouragement of open access to interstate pipelines'
systems, the increased opportunities exhibited by industrial and commercial users of
natural gas, and the varied approaches available to state commissions to regulate local
transportation markets.
Id.
56. Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol,
50 Fed.Reg. 42,408 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 18 C.F.R.), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter AGD 1],
cert. denied, Shell Offshore Inc. v. Associated Gas Distribs., 485 U.S. 1006 (1988), on remand,
Order No. 500, 52 Fed.Reg. 30,334 (1987).
57. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 48 F.E.R.C. at 61,828-29. The Commission observed
that:
The goal of [current] policy is to provide incentives and opportunities that allow all
shippers, industrial users as well as LDC and other parties, to benefit by access to com-
modity and transportation markets at price levels indicating market discipline.
[B]enefits... include clear and diverse pressures and opportunities assuring the availa-
bility of gas services at [the] lowest reasonable costs.
ld; see also AGD 1, 824 F.2d at 993-94.
58. Previously, end-user customers were unable to purchase natural gas at the wellhead at
prevailing market prices because interstate pipelines would not transport such gas if that gas
would compete with their sales. See AGD 1, 824 F.2d at 996.
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able to gain entry into new downstream end-use markets because Or-
der No. 436 simplified traditional section 7 (NGA) certification re-
quirements. Instead of having to complete a complicated procedure
showing the "convenience and necessity" for new services and facili-
ties or for a transportation plan, pipelines were permitted to obtain
pre-approved "blanket" certification if they agreed to provide nondis-
criminatory access to whoever requested it.59 The rationale behind
lowering such barriers to entry was based on the premise that in-
creased competition through open access sales and transportation
would prove best for the industry and would enable pipelines to re-
main competitive."
Order No. 436 gave pipelines facing mounting take-or-pay liabil-
ity the right to convert their sales obligations under their wellhead
contracts to transportation entitlements from other suppliers.61 For
example, if a pipeline customer was reluctant to pay the "take-or-pay"
rate for gas, the pipeline could respond by offering to trade its sales
service for its transportation service and apply it to its wellhead con-
tract.62 Consequently, pipelines could lessen their obligations to some
extent by agreeing to surrender their sales monopoly to the down-
stream market. Despite these efforts however, take-or-pay would
continue to remain an irascible problem.63
Order No. 436 permitted customers to purchase gas from any
available supplier. Consequently, interstate pipelines and local distri-
bution companies were confronted with the problem of "bypass." In
59. In exchange for benefitting from this expedited certification process, pipelines, in turn,
assumed the entire risk of their investments. Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,467.
60. Id. at 42,410.
61. Id. at 42,409.
62. 18 C.F.R. § 284.10 (1990).
63. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Upon judicial
review, the Circuit of the District of Columbia upheld the primary provisions of the Order. It
approved the shift toward favoring increased competition within the industry and let stand its
common-carrier and blanket certification provisions. Yet, the court remanded for further pro-
ceedings because the Commission failed to fully address the pipeline's take-or-pay problems in
connection with its new open access policy and failed to explain adequately its reasons for not
doing so. Judge Williams expressed reservations that the FERC had not examined the possibil-
ity that Order No. 436 would enable more pipeline customers to buy cheaper gas directly from
producers, thereby increasing the pipelines' take-or-pay exposure, and denying pipelines' neces-
sary bargaining leverage in settling their take-or-pay liability with producers. Id. at 1020-30.
Although the Court concluded that the take-or-pay problem was "not enough to block nec-
essary pro-competitive reforms," it did assert that the Commission's "seeming blindness to the
possible impact of Order No. 436 on take-or-pay liability, and its tendency to elevate into affirm-
ative benefits what are at best palliatives, seem impossible to square with the requirement of
reasoned decision making." Id. at 1027, 1025.
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the natural gas industry, bypass refers to "the development of special-
ized facilities that circumvent those facilities owned and operated by
the [pipeline or the LDC]. ' 64 In encouraging various segments of the
industry to seek out alternative sources of natural gas, Order No. 436
placed the pipelines and LDCs in a tenuous position. Having based all
of their business expectations and decisions upon having a reliable
pool of customers, they both faced the prospect of having some of
these customers "bypass" their facilities and obtain gas supplies else-
where. Failure to replace lost customers with new ones would pro-
duce substantial losses. On a grander scale, such a result would harm
the pipelines who were already saddled with contractual obligations,
and would harm the LDCs who did not exhibit the monopolistic fea-
tures or substantial economies of scale unique to the pipelines, and
thus, could compete with the former only at a competitive
disadvantage.65
In retrospect, the end-user customers were perhaps the most
likely to be hurt the most by 436-induced bypass. Occupying the last
link in the natural gas distribution chain, end-users purchase gas on
the intrastate market from the local distribution companies. The fixed
costs which the LDCs incur in purchasing gas from the regulated pipe-
lines and then reselling it to end-users was typically spread throughout
their customer base (subject of course to the applicable local regula-
tions). Under the system of "open access" however, the larger indus-
trial end-users opted to pursue more competitively priced alternatives.
They either completely bypassed the LDC and constructed their own
pipeline spurs to the pipeline, or they switched to an alternative en-
ergy source altogether.66 The loss of these large "switchable" custom-
ers67 left the "captive '68 users to absorb the LDC costs as reflected in
the gas rate.69 Such users, usually smaller industrial units or individual
residences, had neither the means nor the flexibility to bypass the
64. Paul MacAvoy et al., Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in
Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 211 (1989); bypass is defined more generically as
the "entry of an alternate supply source in a partially deregulated market." Id.
65. Harry G. Broadman & Joseph P. Kalt, How Natural is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass
in Natural Gas Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 184-85 (1989).
66. Id. at 186.
67. A "switchable" customer is one who has the means to change its energy source alto-
gether. Kansas Power & Light Comp. v. FERC, 851 F.2d 1479, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
68. A "captive" customer, by contrast, does not possess such flexibility and thus is generally
bound to the service. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. FERC, 998 F.2d 1313, 1316 (5th
Cir. 1993).
69. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 65, at 208.
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LDC market 70 Forced to receive gas from the LDCs, these remaining
"captives" were exposed to large scale increases in their gas rates be-
cause they were the end-user least able to respond to price changes.71
Perhaps in the long run, these prices will ultimately decrease as a com-
petitive natural gas market forces sellers to lower rates. In the mean
time, however, consumers are sure to be harmed if rates increase with
the lifting of regulatory controls.
VIII. LEADING UP TO 636: ORDER Nos. 500 & 528
Upon the D.C. Circuit's remand of Order No. 436, the Commis-
sion issued Order 500, an interim rule that instituted a policy of "equi-
table sharing" of take-or-pay liability across the natural gas industry
among producers, pipelines, and LDC and end-user customers.72 The
competitive provisions of Order No. 436, which provided the incen-
tives for pipelines to assume open access status and to convert de-
mand rights to transportation rights, were consistent with the D.C.
Circuit's opinion and therefore retained.73 The fulcrum of Order No.
500 was a policy concerning "acceptable passthrough mechanisms" by
which pipelines in individual rate proceedings could recover take-or-
pay buyout and buydown costs from their customers.74 The Order al-
70. In one LDC bypass case, a large industrial end-user who wished to build six feet of
pipeline faced an $81,000 price tag. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 46 F.E.R.C. '1 61,270 at
61,792 (1989).
71. This scenario is illustrated in vivid detail in Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 1
63,009, at 65,039 (1987), as an LDC incurred a $51 million loss as a result of bypass and therefore
had to allocate the costs to its remaining captive users.
72. Judge Williams wrote in Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC that "[all actors in the natu-
ral gas industry" other than "fuel switchable users, who... [could] employ the cheapest fuel
competing with gas and thus... [could not] be induced to pay more than the current competitive
[wellhead] price," were "candidates" for absorbing take-or-pay liabilities. 824 F.2d 981, 1021
(D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter AGD 1].
73. Order No. 500-H promulgated the Commission's final rule. III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
30,867 (1989) and Order No. 500-I, Il F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 1 30,880 (1990), substantially
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in American Gas Assoc. v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1520 (D.C. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
74. Because the take-or-pay issue was the primary stumbling block on the industry's route
toward open access, the Commission reasoned it was only fair that all parties contribute to its
resolution:
In many instances, pipeline take-or-pay obligations mounted because of reduced
purchases by their customers due to purchases from alternative suppliers, fuel switching
by industrial users due to lower fuel oil prices, reduced levels of economic activity, and
conservation. The Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign blame for the
pipeline industry's take-or-pay problems. In brief, no one segment of the natural gas
industry or particular circumstance appears wholly responsible for the pipelines' excess
inventories of gas. As a result, all segments should shoulder some burden of resolving
this problem.
Order No. 500, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,778-79.
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lowed a pipeline to pass its prudently incurred buydown75 and
buyout 76 costs through to customers by means of a straight commodity
surcharge on sales, the traditional means of recovering costs. 77 In
promulgating Order No. 500, however, the Commission recognized
that the open access pipelines' loss of sales customers might increase if
the sales commodity rate rose substantially. Therefore, Order 500
also designed an alternative mechanism that permitted open access
pipelines to share with their customers a portion of the costs incurred
in settling their take-or-pay liability.78
The D.C. Circuit also remanded Order No. 500 because of its
purchase deficiency mechanism which, according to the Court, unnec-
essarily harmed the consumer.79 Under this mechanism, the FERC
allowed pipeline customers to pay charges according to past purchases
which were less than what their pipeline contracts stipulated. The
court held that attempting to pass on costs stemming from these cu-
mulative purchase deficiencies violated the "filed rate doctrine."80
In response, the FERC issued Order No. 528,81 allowing pipelines
to develop new allocation methods to replace the deficiency allocation
method that the D.C. Circuit struck down. Orders No. 528 and 528-A
attempted to resolve the take-or-pay controversy without reversing
any of the competitive advances that the Commission had promoted
within the industry. These Orders also revealed the FERC's contin-
ued shift away from the interests of the customer. They provided that
(1) costs should be spread as broadly as possible so that "all segments
of the industry - pipelines, producers, LDCs, industrial end users
75. Buydown denotes a payment accompanying renegotiation of a contract which results in
a reduced price term, an extension of delivery terms, a reduction in the total quantity to be
purchased, or some combination thereof. WILLIAMS & MEnYRs, supra note 47, at 135.
76. Buyout is a pipeline's payment to extinguish take-or-pay liabilities through a change in
a long-term supply contract. AGD 1, 824 F.2d at 1021.
77. 18 C.F.R. § 2.104(a) (1992).
78. Under this alternative mechanism, if the pipeline agreed to absorb between 25 percent
and 50 percent of the buydown and buyout costs, it would be allowed to recover an equal
amount by means of a direct charge to its sales customers, rather than attempting to collect such
costs through the unpredictable commodity rate. The pipeline would then be allowed to attempt
to recover the balance, if any, by means of a volumetric surcharge on both sales and transporta-
tion of gas. Order No. 500-H, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,867, at 31,547-31,576 (1989).
79. Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 907 (1990) [hereinafter AGD II].
80. Under the "filed rate doctrine," a regulated entity is forbidden "to charge rates for its
services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority." Ar-
kansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).
81. Order No. 528, Order on Remand Staying Collection of Take-or-Pay Fixed Charges and
Directing Filing of Revised Tariff Provisions, 53 F.E.R.C. [ 61,163 at 61,593 (1990), reh'g granted
in part and denied in part by, Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. 61,095 (1991), appeal dismissed sub
nom; Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, No. 91-1069 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
19
Fagan: From Regulation to Deregulation: The Diminishing Role of the Smal
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
and other consumers - should contribute to funding the pipelines'
take-or-pay costs;" (2) pipelines should absorb a significant propor-
tion of the costs; (3) "captive sales customers - namely residential
and small commercial gas users - should not bear a disproportionate
share of take-or-pay costs;" and (4) pipelines and producers should
abide by existing settlement agreements.82
IX. Ti NEW WORLD ORDER OF DEREGULATION:
ORDER No. 636
To date, the FERC continues the push towards deregulation with
Order No. 636. The goal of Order No. 636 is a national gas market
where a buyer can reach many sellers by meaningful access to the
pipeline transportation grid. 3 A deregulated national market can be
achieved only after all of the affected interstate pipelines restructure
their services, and subsequently, resolve the inevitable disputes.8 4
Anong the aims of Order No. 636 is the preservation of unbun-
dled pipeline services as originally promulgated in the NGPA, and the
regime of open access, as introduced in the Order No. 436. Specifi-
cally, Order No. 636 requires pipelines to make their transportation
and storage services available to any segment that desires them. To
enable the pipelines to respond flexibly to these changes, the Order
allows blanket sales certificates to be issued allowing pipelines to sell
unbundled gas on a comparable basis with unregulated sellers. In ad-
dition, take-or-pay costs will continue to be recovered under Order
82. Order No. 528, 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,596-97.
83. On rehearing, the Commission summarized the rationale supporting Order No. 636:
In brief, the Commission found that the pre-Order No. 636 regulatory structure of the
pipeline industry has, and will continue to have, a harmful impact on all segments of the
natural gas industry and on the Nation. The Commission concluded that it was appro-
priate to take remedial action to improve the competitive structure of the natural gas
industry to further the creation of an efficient national wellhead market for gas without
adversely affecting the quality and reliability of the service provided by pipelines to
their customers. The Commission believes that its action will result in a modern, viable,
natural gas industry specifically fashioned to the needs of all gas consumers and the
Nation for an adequate and reliable supply of clean and abundant natural gas at rea-
sonable prices.
Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. T 30,950 at 30,526, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128, at 36,130
(1992).
84. As of September 29, 1993, the Commission approved the last of the 76 pipeline restruc-
turing plans. In practical terms, all of the affected pipelines had to begin implementing Order
No. 636 for the upcoming 1993-94 heating season which officially began on November 1, 1993.
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No. 528 until a "market-based pricing mechanism" develops. To bet-
ter effectuate Order 636's proposed regulatory scheme, the Commis-
sion intends to open restructuring proceedings for each pipeline and
to invite the participation of industry parties. The proceedings will
allow for negotiation of the market-based pricing mechanisms for un-
bundled pipeline sales, as well as for a full recovery of pipeline transi-
tion costs (including take-or-pay costs) arising from compliance with
the Order.85
Organizations representing small customers have responded
quickly to Order No. 636.86 Generally, their concerns reflect the be-
lief that this segment of the industry is the least able to take advantage
of the opportunities presented by open-access. This inherent inflexi-
bility will not only deny captive customers the benefits of the new
competitive marketplace, it will also shift onto them a disproportion-
ate share of the transition burden.
85. Pipelines' Wishes Fulfilled As Commission Issues Restructuring Rule, INSIDE FERC,
Apr. 13, 1992, at 1, 11-15.
86. Dozens of groups representing consumer interests filed petitions for rehearing of Order
No. 636 within days after it was issued on April 8, 1992. In July, formal hearings were held by
the House Energy and Power Subcommittee in which then FERC Chairman, Martin Allday, was
forced to defend the rule against lawmakers who were concerned of its impact upon residential
customers. See Thomas F. Berg, Order 636 Heats Up House Hearing, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 15,
1992, at 26. As of September 2, 1992, 40 parties had petitioned for rehearing of Order No. 636-
A, which was issued in response to the criticisms leveled at 636. See Petitions for Rehearing of
Order No. 636-A Attack Several Modifications to Order No. 636 Rule, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP.
No. 1893, Sept. 10, 1992, at 22. More recently, Rep. Phillip P. Sharp (D-Ind.), the Chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Energy & Power, wrote a letter to the Commission in which he
took it to task for underestimating the impact of Order No. 636 upon captive customers. In the
September 29, 1993 letter, Sharp borrowed heavily from a draft General Accounting Office
study of the restructuring rule which criticized FERC for relying upon overly optimistic
assumptions.
In sum, the Commission seems to have burdened captive customers, not helped
them. It seems to have understated their burdens, and overstated their benefits. It
seems to have taken pains to prevent burdens of favored industry segments, while not
even discussing burdens on unfavored segments. It seems to have put the order's bene-
fits on favored groups, and its burdens on unfavored groups.
Sharp Rains On Commission Parade Over Order 636 Implementation, INSIDE FERC, Oct. 4,
1993, at 1, 7.
87. The general outcry against the impact of Order No. 636 upon residential end-users can-
not be dismissed as merely the product of "special interest" politics. In November of 1993, the
independent General Accounting Office (GAO), in response to a June, 1992 request by the
House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John D. Dingell, among others, released a
final report of its analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of Order No. 636. The report
expressed strong reservations about the alleged benefits which FERC claimed the restructuring
rule would engender, especially where it concerned the small consumer. After considering the
potential shift in fixed costs among pipeline customers, the probable transition costs incurred by
the pipelines in implementing the new rule, as well as the estimated costs and benefits attributa-
ble to unbundling, the GAO observed that "[s]ignificant questions remain about the economic
impacts of Order [No.] 636." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CoSTS, BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
RELATED TO FERC's ORDER 636 16 (1993).
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Several aspects of Order No. 636 raise troubling questions for
those who represent small consumers. One such aspect concerns the
increasing phenomenon of bypass. As large LDCs and industrial end-
users continue to bypass with the FERC's encouragement, the cost of
gas will inevitably increase for the captive customers.88 Secondly, the
restructuring rule does not appear to contain any mandatory require-
ments for the pipelines to contain the costs of their restructuring. To
be sure, the Commission urges pipelines to try to accommodate the
concerns of the captive customers, but accommodation is not neces-
sary. Finally, consumer groups view Order No. 636 with alarm. Its
provisions for transition cost recovery and straight fixed variable
(SFV) rate design seem to undermine FERC's statutory duty to pro-
tect the natural gas consumer. One of the provisions of Order No. 636
which met with the most resistance allows pipelines to recover one
hundred percent of their prudently incurred transition costs.89 This
provision undoubtedly represents the FERC's efforts to ease the im-
pact which mandatory unbundling and open access will have on the
individual pipelines. Nevertheless, the provision holds stark implica-
tions for the captive customer. Switchable pipeline customers, know-
ing that their cost of gas will necessarily increase as these transition
costs are recovered, will surely bypass in favor of another supplier.
With a smaller customer base left to absorb the full brunt of the re-
structuring transition, pipelines will have little choice but to pass
through these costs to their remaining residential and other captive
customers.90
88. See House Subcommittee Debates Economic Impact of Order No. 636 and State Prora-
tioning Policies, FoSTER NAT. GAS MEP. No. 1884, July 9,1992, at 1 (explaining that one pipeline,
Texas Eastern, estimated that the increase in rates for its small customers would be 136%).
Recently, the chief executive officer of the Washington Gas Light Company, a local distri-
bution company, announced that his company's fixed costs for fiscal year 1994, with Order No.
636 transition costs factored in, will be almost 40% higher than in fiscal year 1992 which was the
period immediately prior to the implementation of pipeline restructuring. Order No. 636, in this
executive's view, will "result in a potentially serious destabilization of the industry and higher
gas costs for millions of residential and small commercial consumers." Marshall Yates, GAO's
Final Order-636 Report Restates Doubts About Benefits, NAT. GAS WEEK, Nov. 15,1993, at 1,10.
89. See Order No. 636-A, II F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,950, at 30,641 (1992). Transition
costs include those borne by the pipeline companies to (1) modify existing gas supply contracts
with producers to reflect the realities of the deregulated environment ("gas supply realignment
costs"); (2) abandon equipment, such as storage facilities, which are no longer necessary because
of Order No. 636 ("stranded costs"); (3) retire unpaid balances on gas supplies that the pipeline
companies previously sold to their customers ("Account No. 191 balances") and (4) purchase
required new equipment, such as gas metering stations and electronic bulletin boards that show
available transportation capacity and other data ("new facility costs"). Id. at 30,457.
90. These costs are hardly insignificant. According to the GAO study, the pipeline compa-
nies' estimate of transition costs as of July 21, 1993, is about $4.8 billion. The overall figure,
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Issued on August 3, 1992, Order No. 636-A reaffirmed the
FERC's commitment to 100 percent transition cost recovery. 91 On
rehearing, the Commission rejected small customer petitions which
maintained that the planned recovery was patently unfair. The FERC
declined to fashion a special exception for small customers on the
grounds that steps had already been taken to "secure the benefits of
restructuring and mitigate any adverse effects."'  Without providing
any concrete assurances, it noted that "small customers should not be
unduly burdened by transition costs on most pipeline systems."'93 The
Commission did modify the initial rule somewhat by adding a require-
ment that pipelines must recover ten percent of their gas supply re-
alignment costs (GSR) from their interruptible customers. 94 These
same customers, however, are the same customers who can readily
switch away from natural gas in favor of another energy source at any
time. This provision will still leave captive customers responsible for
90 percent of pipeline transition costs. If it is a truthful assertion that
overall transition costs will approach five billion dollars, surely a mere
10 percent "discount" for captive customers will hardly relieve them
of their disproportionate burden. If the FERC is to continue to honor
its half century commitment to the natural gas consumer, it must do
more than simply announce lukewarm measures which appear to af-
ford only modest protections at best.95
Order No. 636 exposes the captive customer further because of
however, is probably higher; according to FERC, twenty-four pipelines have not yet reported
their transition cost figures. GENERAL ACCOUNnNG OFICE, supra note 87, at 10.
91. See Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., at 30,641. Four months later the
Commission issued Order 636-B which denied rehearing of Order No. 636-A and made no
changes to the underlying provisions. Order No. 636-B, Order Denying Rehearing and Clarify-
ing Order Nos. 636 and 636-A, 61 F.E.R.C. 61,272, at 61,988 (1992); see also FERC Wraps Up
Restructuring Rule, Turns Full Attention to Compliance, INSIDE FERC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
92. Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., at 30,655. Nothing precludes the pipe-
lines from voluntarily absorbing some of the costs themselves, but they cannot be forced to do
so. Id. at 30,649.
93. Id. at 30,641.
94. Id. at 30,643.
95. Not surprisingly, the GAO report was skeptical of the FERC's treatment of the residen-
tial gas user in its position on transition cost recovery. Although the GOA agreed with FERC's
contention that much of the transition costs arising from implementing the new rule would have
been incurred any way, it did acknowledge that permitting pipelines 100 percent transition cost
recovery "raises questions about whether the companies will have a strong incentive to minimize
such costs." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 87, at 10, 16.
As it currently stands, the individual pipeline "rate" proceedings, as opposed to the already
completed "restructuring" proceedings, loom large on the FERC horizon in the upcoming year.
According to Chair Elizabeth Moler, of the "2nd-generation" Order No. 636 issues, the question
of transition cost-recovery promises to be "the next major gas issue." INSIDE FERC, Sept. 20,
1993 at 9.
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the straight fixed variable (SFV) rate design mechanism.96 An SFV
rate design includes all fixed costs relating to transportation in the
reservation charge, so that pipelines will generally compete with one
another with the same levels of fixed costs between them. 7 This "lev-
eling of the playing field" is intended to make pipeline transportation
service more responsive to market forces. Therefore, a given pipe-
line's competitive position will depend upon its own efficiencies in
providing service, instead of upon the vagaries of fluctuating usage
charges.98 Consequently, captive residential consumers, the class of
customer most dependent upon firm service, will bear a greater share
of their pipeline supplier's fixed costs than before because those fixed
costs will always be included in the reservation charge. The likely re-
sult will be a large shifting of costs from one group of customers to
another. Interruptible customers, those best suited to react to market
forces, will not be as affected by the SFV rate design as their rates
have always been based upon usage, rather than reservation charges.
Since the FERC intends to include fixed costs within the reservation
charge, the firm captive customers, whose rates are determined by the
reservation charge, will experience a subsequent increase in their
rates.99
Despite strident protests to the SFV proposal upon rehearing, the
96. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing
Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial well-
head Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992).
97. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg.
30,334, at 30,335 (1987). The SFV rate design replaces the modified fixed variable (MFV) ap-
proach. Under the latter design, pipelines were insulated from competition from alternative
energy sources such as oil. Under these rates, pipelines' fixed costs were assigned to the reserva-
tion charge (or demand component of the overall rate). This served usually to lower their fixed
costs included in the commodity component (or usage charge) relative to those in the demand
charge. Under MFV, fixed costs included in the usage charge often differed from pipeline to
pipeline; with SFV, these costs are constant. Id.98. Order No. 636,57 Fed. Reg. 36,128,30,434 (1992). By contrast, under MFV, "producers
in different fields that compete for market share via different pipelines will often have their
competitive positions in that market affected by the amount of fixed costs in the pipelines' re-
spective transportation usage charges and not by the producers' own costs and efficiencies in
producing gas." Id.
99. The GAO report concluded that the change to SFV rate design could shift $1.2 billion
annually in fixed costs to those captive customers. In practical terms, such a shift would be
reflected in an increase in firm customer's responsibility for the entire pipeline industry's $11.4
billion if fixed costs from 65 to 76 percent. Individual customers, noted the GAO could expect to
experience increases in their gas bills of up to nine percent. Non-residential end-users, by con-
trast, could expect a three to seven percent decrease. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 87, at 6-7. See also Marshall Yates, GAO's Final Order-636 Report Restates Doubts About
Benefits, NAT. GAS WEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 1, 10. Nevertheless, in a statement that can hardly
provide much comfort to customers, the GAO did observe that the final cost-shift numbers "can-
not be determined with any degree of precision until Order 636 has been implemented." GEN-
ERAL AccorNTiNG OmE, supra note 87, at 8.
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/6
1994] NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY SMALL CONSUMER 731
Commission rejected petitioner requests to change its position. Con-
ceding that reliance upon SFV, as opposed to MFV, would probably
shift costs somewhat, it nevertheless maintained that it would also
favor the lowest cost pipelines, and in time, such benefits would be
passed along to the consumer in the form of lower rates. 1°° The
FERC did include a requirement in 636-A that parties to the restruc-
turing proceedings must consider various rate-making techniques to
help mitigate cost shifts onto customers. 01 For example, in order to
distribute the SFV cost responsibility among all customers, parties
could adopt rates based upon seasonal contract quantities. Conse-
quently, firm captive customers could reduce daily reservation quanti-
ties during off-peak seasons without jeopardizing such quantities
during the peak times."° If none of these suggested techniques pre-
vents a dramatic cost shift, Order No. 636 provides for a four year
mitigation plan. Under this provision, pipelines would be required to
phase in cost shifts of greater than 10% for any class of customers for
up to four years.' 3
The main problem with the Commission's efforts to mitigate
large-scale cost shifts created by the adoption of the SFV rate design
lies in the fact that no particular rate-making technique is required.
Rather, rates are to be determined by the pipeline and its customers in
the individual rate-making proceedings."° Without a forceful FERC
mandate expressly requiring the pipelines to adopt a specific method-
ology for mitigating SFV costs, it is difficult to envision how their cus-
tomers can possibly bargain on an even footing. Despite reaffirming
100. In the Commission's view, the use of SFV would "over time force the evolution of a set
of lowest-cost producers to yield lower prices and more abundant supplies to the benefit of all
consumers of gas." Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 1 30,950, at 30,593 (1992)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 29, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 7 (1989)).
101. Id. at 30,599.
102. Id. at 30,604. Nevertheless, the Commission refused to consider mitigation on a case-
by-ease basis - as most petitioners were claiming different economic injuries - but rather, would
only look at the impacts upon historic classes of customers. This refusal was just "because rates
historically have been set by customer class and not for individual customers." Id.
103. Id. at 30,603-04.
104. If recent pipeline efforts to recover costs related to restructuring are any indication,
opposition by consumers and the LDCs who serve them will be fierce indeed. For example, in
late February, 1994, the Commission tentatively approved $28.2 million in transition cost recov-
ery for Natural Gas Pipeline Company, $19 million for Northwest Pipeline, $5.6 million for Mis-
sissippi River Transmission, and $11 million for Texas Gas Transmission Corporation. These
orders, and the rate increases which will invariably follow, will not take effect until all opposing
parties exhaust their administrative and judicial remedies, or reach a settlement with the respec-
tive pipelines. Daniel Drosdoff, FERC Gives Green Light, NAT. GAs WEEK, Feb. 28, 1994, at 1,
14. Undoubtedly, these four pipelines and the 72 others which have implemented Order No. 636
on their systems will encounter stiff opposition as they seek to recover their transition costs.
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its concern with customer costs under Order No. 636-A, the Commis-
sion has failed to provide these groups with sufficient leverage to pre-
vent pipelines from refusing to mitigate.10 5
In its own right, Order No. 636-A added two other modifications
to the restructuring rule for the purpose of protecting small customers.
One of these modifications attempts to help customers adjust to the
post-636 transition. Blanket unbundled sales certificates would be is-
sued unless pipelines offer to sell gas at traditional cost-based rates. 10 6
These rates would remain in force for one year after the pipeline's
complete compliance with Order No. 636. This provision would serve
to keep customer rates lower than market-based levels for a period of
time allowing them an opportunity to find alternative supply arrange-
ments, as they will no longer be bound to any one supplier.10 7
Despite this grace period, it is questionable whether customers
will be capable of finding alternative supply arrangements so easily.
After years of having one LDC and one pipeline as their industry liai-
sons, in spite of having some extra time, captive customers will not
have the necessary flexibility of their switchable counterparts. With
their limited resources and less-than-imposing bargaining strength,
this class will be hard-pressed to exact price terms more favorable
than the traditional cost-based ones to which they have been
accustomed.
On rehearing, the Commission added a second change to Order
No. 636. Pipelines are required to permanently offer a one-part volu-
metric rate to small customers.0 8 This rate, computed by the existing
105. The GAO study withheld judgment on the mitigation measures which the Commission
proposed. It conceded that implementation of the restructuring rule would undoubtedly create
higher costs for residential consumers, and otherwise acknowledged that it was "too early to
determine how well the [mitigation] measures will work." GENERAL ACCOUNrMNo OFMCE,
supra note 87, at 16.
From the consumer standpoint, there have been some encouraging signs. In a November
22, 1993, reply letter to Rep. Phillip P. Sharp (D-Ind.), the Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Energy & Power, who had himself written the Commission a letter raising questions
about potential impacts upon consumers, Chair Moler indicated that the Commission may be
open to exempting certain pipelines from the SFV rate design. Such exceptions, she observed,
could be permitted where it could be demonstrated that such modifications would reduce cost
shifts to firm customers. See Daniel Drosdoff, Moler Tells Sharp to Chill Out, But LDC Chief
Rips Order 636, NAT. GAS WEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 1, 9.
106. Id. at 30,609.
107. As most pipelines did not meet the compliance requirements of Order No. 636 until
after the 1992-93 heating season, small customers, for all intents and purposes, had two years
with which to adjust their behavior. See FERC Revamps Restructuring Rule to Ease Small-Cus-
tomer Concerns, INSIDE FERC, Aug. 3, 1992, 1 at 9.
108. Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,950, at 30,545 (1992).
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load factor, would allow the customer "to book capacity without pay-
ing a reservation charge."'1 9 In order to permit a wider class of cus-
tomers to take advantage of this rate, pipelines would be encouraged
to expand the definition of "small customer" to include those who
transport up to 10,000 Mcf/day."n The net effect of offering one-part
volumetric service would be the insulation of small customers from
some of the price increases sure to flow from full compliance with
Order No. 636.
Although on its face, one-part volumetric service appears to pro-
vide adequate protection for small customers, it contains a limitation
which dampens much of its cost-mitigating impact. This limitation
provides that only pipelines which offered sales or firm transportation
services on this same basis to small customers by May 18, 1992, the
effective date of Order No. 636, are required to do so under the added
provision."' If the Commission was serious about its obligation to
the natural gas consumer, it arguably would not narrowly restrict the
scope of this mitigating provision to only a select few.
X. CONCLUSION
Assuming the complete deregulation of the natural gas industry is
all but inevitable, a tension has emerged between the FERC's man-
date to protect the individual customer, and the need to guarantee a
reliable supply of natural gas. Although its regulatory emphasis may
have changed since 1938, the FERC's historic mission has not. No
one disputes that a free, unregulated market for natural gas will bene-
fit all concerned." 2 However, until that point is finally reached, the
transition will be a painful one. The traditional linchpins of the indus-
try, the interstate pipelines, have staggering costs, such as take-or-pay,
109. INSIDE FERC, supra note 107, at 1.
110. Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,545-46.
111. Id. at 30,545.
112. A dispute exists over just how much the benefits of Order No. 636 will exceed its costs.
The GAO study criticized FERC's projections of net social benefits to be $2-$6 billion annually,
and $15-$42 billion by the end of the century. The GAO faulted the projections for being based
upon independent predictions of future increases in gas demand which failed to even consider
the effects of Order No. 636. The absence of a connection between the rule itself and the data
relied upon to calculate its benefits prompted the GAO to label the Commission's analysis as
"questionable." In its view, the net benefits to be derived from Order No. 636 are not capable of
being precisely quantified at this time. Nevertheless, the report noted, the final judgment will
turn in large measure upon how small consumers' concerns are resolved. "These concerns in-
clude the effects of the new rate design, the extent of the transition costs (and the question of
who will pay such costs) and the potential impact of the reliability of service, particularly service
to distribution companies serving small communities." GENERAL ACCOUNING OFFICE, supra
note 87, at 13-14, 3-4.
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which must be resolved before full deregulation can take hold. In a
system of open access and unbundled service, the pipelines can only
truly influence the behavior of the small customers. Yet, it is they who
are the most vulnerable and the most incapable of bearing these tran-
sition costs."13 Unless more comprehensive steps are taken to ensure
that these customers do not absorb the full impact of deregulation, the
brave new world envisioned by Order No. 636 will be a bleak one for
them indeed." 4
It would seem to be in the best interests of the individual pipe-
lines to work out final restructuring arrangements which do not un-
duly prejudice residential consumers. Unfortunately, the FERC has
not provided any guidance for accomplishing this task. If, as con-
sumer groups fear, the restructuring proceedings resemble dictations
of terms more than bona fide negotiations, it is highly unlikely that the
636 transition will be completed with a minimum of fuss. Individual
proceedings are bound to be contested and the final implementation
of the restructuring rules will undoubtedly be delayed as they run the
full gamut of administrative and judicial challenges. In what may be
the greatest irony, the Commission's failure to adequately protect the
small consumer in its issuance of Order No. 636, will probably result
in an indefinite delay in its final implementation. This delay will actu-
ally prolong industry regulation, instead of hastening its demise.
113. Despite stating that it "is sympathetic to the concerns raised by small customers," the
Commission did not offer much hope for optimism upon rehearing. "Should the small customers
believe that the pipeline prices are not reasonable, because of the exercise of market power, they
may seek appropriate relief from the Commission." Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. &
Regs. at 30,545.
114. It is interesting to note that in the proposed form of Order No. 636 there was an initial
provision which excluded small customers from the unbundled sales requirement. To protect
against large-scale market-based swings in gas prices, the Commission wished to permit them to
continue receiving service on a bundled basis. See FERC Majority Nearing Consensus on Most
Aspects of Pipeline Industry Restructuring Rule, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., supra note 86, at 1.
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